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KLOPPING v. CITY OF WHITTIER: IMPROVING
THE VALUATION PROCESS FOR
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
The social principle underlying condemnation law is that a
private property owner's losses should be distributed among the
taxpaying public when the property is appropriated for public use.'
The constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the public tak-
ing of private property is insured by two procedures: eminent do-
main and inverse condemnation. The best known of the two is emi-
nent domain, also called direct condemnation, permitting a condemnor
to take private property for public use. This note focuses on inverse
condemnation, which allows an owner to sue for the fair market value
of property which allegedly has been appropriated for public use.
Klopping v. City of Whittier2 specifically addresses the question of
proper valuation for the property to reflect losses occurring prior to
the date of actual taking.
The state and federal constitutions guarantee just compensation
in inverse condemnation cases as for eminent domain.3  Likewise
the substantive valuation rules apply equally in either case. In gen-
eral, just compensation is measured by the fair market value of the
property at the time of the taking.4  Market value is defined as "the
1. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14; see Rose v. State, 19
Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); VAN ALSTYNE, Inverse Condemnation Goals and
Policy Criteria, in CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, CALIFORNIA INVERSE CONDEMNATION
LAW 75, 86, 99-101 (1971); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1168
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman].
2. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972). Inverse condemna-
tion and eminent domain are on opposite sides of the same legal coin. See Holtz v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 303, 475 P.2d 441, 445, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345. 349 (1970);
VAN ALSTYNE, Scope of Legislative Power, in CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, CALIFORNIA
INVERSE CONDEMNATION LAW 15, 18 & n.16 (1971). See generally Mandelker, Inverse
Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 3.
3. See generally 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law
§ 223, at 2033 (7th ed. 1960). The relationship and demarcation between compen-
sable takings and police power actions for which no compensation is required lies be-
yond the scope of this Note. See generally Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV.
62; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
4. Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 737, 123 P.2d 505, 519 (1942). "Taking" can
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highest price estimated in terms of money which the land would bring
if exposed for sale in the open market, with reasonable time allowed
in which to find a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all the uses
and purposes to which it was adapted and for which it was capa-
ble."5
Since market value constantly fluctuates, the courts must fix a
date from which to measure fair market value, thus ignoring prior
and subsequent changes in the value. Ideally, the date of valuation
will coincide with the date on which the condemnor is determined
to have acquired ownership of the property.' However, a variety
of circumstances may occur prior to that date which will artificially
depress the value of the property.7 In these cases a different valua-
tion date must be used so as to assure the owner full compensation for
the land.8 In recent times, acts which most commonly cause an
artificial depreciation in market value arise from massive urban re-
newal projects. In various urban areas in the United States, the initia-
tion of renewal is characterized by the condemnor creating a wasteland
in the inner city area because of scattered demolition and discontin-
uance of city services. The businesses and landowners remaining in
the area after the first series of eminent domain suits lose customers,
tenants, and profits; of course, the market value of their properties
plummets as a result.9
occur in a number of ways but in the usual case it is the result of issuance of a con-
demnation summons. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1249 (West 1972).
5. Sacramento S.R.R. Co. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 P. 979, 980
(1909).
6. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1249 (West 1972). In California the statutory valua-
tion date for eminent domain is the date of issuance of the condmenation summons.
7. The situation has been characterized as placing the landowners under "a
sword of Damocles". 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12-3151, at
12-293 (rev. 3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; see Kanner, Condemnation
Blight: Just How Just is Just Condemnation?, 48 NOM DAME LAW. 765 (1973).
8. See Danforth v. United-States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939); Sackman, Condemnation
Blight-A Problem in Compensability and Value, 1973 SouTi-WEsTERN LEGAL FOUNDA-
TION INsTIruT ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DovmN 157, 166 (Southwestern
Legal Foundation) [hereinafter cited as Sackman].
9. A typical condemnation case is one in which the time of appropriation is
disputed. This situation contrasts the problem of "taking" from the problem of "just
compensation." The fundamental question is when the ownership of the property
transferred from the private owner to the public condemnor. The owner typically al-
leges that the taking occurred because of oppressive acts by the condemnor which have
deprived the owner of the incidents of ownership. The argument is called a de facto
taking theory. The California Supreme Court said the prevailing rule for de facto taking
is stated in City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., "that a de facto taking requires a physi-
cal entry by the condemnor, a physical ouster of the owner, a legal interference with
use, possession or enjoyment of the property or a legal interference with the owner's
power of disposition of the property." Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 46
500 P.2d 1345, 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1972), citing, 28 N.Y. 2d 241, 255, 269
The valuation process requires a twofold analysis. First, it is
necessary to determine whether the market value of the property has
appreciated or declined during the precondemnation period. 10 Sec-
ondly, one must determine if during the precondemnation period the
parcel was definitely designated for eminent domain or merely within
the undesignated boundaries of a general condemnation zone."
All condemnation valuation cases can be placed in one of the
four categories derived from this analysis. The first case, called en-
hancement, is one in which an undesignated" parcel increases in value
during the precondemnation period. In the event that the parcel even-
tually is designated for condemntation, California allows the owner
to benefit from the increased value by including the appreciation in the
amount of just compensation." The second situation is the converse
of the first, and is called condemnation blight. 4 In this situation,
N.E.2d 895, 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 357 (1971). See generally Kanner, Condemnation
Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765 (1973); 72
COLUM. L. REv. 772 (1972). If the condemnee proves a taking, then just compensa-
tion is valued from the date of de facto taking. As a result, all of the decline in
market value of the property since the de facto taking date, including, for example,
losses from a natural disaster, is part of the compensation owed by the condemnor.
The condemnee would also receive interest on that amount of money since the time
the compensation was payable and reimbursement for the costs of maintaining the
property since the taking. See Comment, Condemnation Blight: Uncompensated Losses
in Eminent Domain Proceedings-Is Inverse Condemnation The Answer?, 3 PAC. L.J.
571, 586-87 (1972).
10. When a desirable project such as a public recreation area is planned, en-
hancement of property values can occur before condemnation plans are completed be-
cause of land speculation over which property will be condemned and which land will
lie on the boundaries of the project. On the other hand, general property values will
decline when the condemnation plans call for an undesirable project such as a garbage
dump. The unfortunate owners whose property is not condemned for the project and
who now border the new garbage dump will receive no compensation for their severe
devaluation losses. Their hope for recovery is that activity by the condemnor will be
of such a magnitude as to establish an inverse condemnation action.
11. Some commentators and cases do not distinguish between the designated par-
cel and undesignated parcel situation. This leads to a classifcation system which only
distinguishes on the basis of de facto taking and condemnation blight. City of Buffalo
v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 209 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971); See
Sackman, supra note 8; cf. Matteoni, Just Compensation, CONDEMNATION PRACTICE IN
CALIFORNIA 44 (Cal. Cont. Ed. Bar 1973).
12. "Undesignated" here is used in a technical sense meaning land which is in
a general zone scheduled for condemnation but which itself is not specifically identi-
fied for condemnation. In fact, it is not certain at that time whether the land will
eventually be condemned.
13. Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 833 (1971).
14. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 45, 500 P.2d 1345, 1350, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6 (1972); Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 n.l,
483 P.2d 1, 3 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 835 n.1 (1971). Condemnation blight occurs
when there are acts by the condemnor which depress land value prior to eminent do-
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property values in a general area decline because an unappealing
project is proposed for the area. As of yet, California has not de-
termined which party should bear such losses.15 The third case is
extremely rare since it occurs when the value of the parcel increases
even though it is designated for condemnation.' 6
The fourth situation is the type that was found in KIopping; there
is a decrease in the value of a designated parcel as a result of public
knowledge of the imminent condemnation. In order to assure just
compensation, a valuation date must be chosen which antedates pub-
lic awareness of the imminent condemnation. The measure of com-
pensation has not previously been interpreted to include the economic
losses suffered by a condemnee aside from decline in market value ac-
cruing during a long precondemnation period. Examples of such
economic losses would include loss of rental income, lost profits, loss
of goodwill, and moving expenses.1 7
Taking these factors into consideration, the narrow legal issues
in Kopping were: (1) when property is definitely designated for fu-
ture condemnation, may a condemnee sue in inverse condemnation
for damages which are reflected in a decline in market value, and,
(2) aside from a recovery based on market value, must economic
losses be indemnified as part of just compensation.
Kopping v. City of Whittier
Kopping v. City of Whittier'8 involved a city's plan to take
the condemnee's property as part of a new parking district. The city
main. By establishing an earlier valuation date, the theory of blight permits a realistic
valuation of the condemned property. City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d
241, 255, 269 N.E.2d 895, 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 357 (1971). This general ap-
proach to blight is qualified in Klopping to apply only to the situation in which the
blighted parcel is not definitely designated for condemnation. 8 Cal. 3d at 45, 500
P.2d at 1350, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
15. Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 n.1, 483 P.2d
1, 3 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 835 n.1 (1971); see Comment, Condemnation Blight: Un-
compensated Losses in Eminent Domain Proceedings-Is Inverse Condemnation the An-
sver?, 3 PAc. L.. 571, 573, 577-78 (1972).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); San Diego Land &
Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888).
17. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 16 (1949) (compensation
for pre-emption of trade routes); Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Du
Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 291-92 (Fla. 1958) (recovery for moving expenses); see
Housing Authority v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 881, 87 S.E.2d
671 (1955); Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: In-
cidental Losses, 67 YALE LJ. 61 (1957).
18. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972). There was other liti-
gation which stymied this project. City of Whittier v. Aramian, 264 Cal. App. 2d 683,
70 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1968); Alpha Beta Acme Mkts, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 262 Cal.
App. 2d 16, 68 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1968).
council's resolution of intent to condemn the owners' properties was
followed by a three year delay before an eminent domain action was
instituted. In the interim, the condemnees filed claims with the city
for their losses reflected by a decline in the value of their parcels and
by losses of anticipated rental income. When the claims were denied,
the condemnees sued in inverse condemnation asserting that this
was a proper form of action to recover losses for a taking of property
without just compensation.' 9 The city argued that there had been no
physical invasion or direct interference with the parcels so as to de-
prive the condemnees of ownership during the precondemnation pe-
riod.2°
The court's holding in this case was twofold. First, the court said
that just compensation includes some precondemnation losses because
property rights must be completely protected. In attempting to find
a balance between encouraging public projects and protecting the op-
pressed owner, the court resolved the conflict by indemnifying only
those precondemnation losses caused by the unreasonable activity of
the condemnor." More precisely, the court held that to effectuate
this principle the condemnee must be given the opportunity to demon-
strate that:
(1) the public authority acted improperly either by unreason-
ably delaying eminent domain action following an announce-
ment of intent to condemn or by other unreasonable conduct prior
to condemnation; and (2) as a result of such action the property
in question suffered a diminution in market value.
22
When determining the amount of compensation, the implementation of
this holding requires a trier of fact to disregard the decline in market
value caused by the activity of the condemnor. 23  The jury evi-
dentially must make the determination from evidence of a higher mar-
ket value prior to the condemnor's activity so as to identify and dis-
count the subsequent depreciation effectively.
Secondly, the Klopping court held that loss of anticipated rental
income should be a factor included in the fair market value appraisal
19. Whereas Klopping had been a party to the final eminent domain proceeding
on his property, Sarff was no longer the real party in interest with respect to his land.
The court therefore allowed Sarff to recover his losses incurred while he owned his
property, but Klopping was barred by res judicata. The court said, "[Klopping] is
barred from seeking those damages in inverse condemnation once the condemnation
proceeding becomes final." 8 Cal. 3d at 58, 500 P.2d at 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 16,
citing Domestic & Foreign Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 562, 51 P.2d
73, 80 (1935); 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment § 166 (2d ed. 1971);
1 CAL. JUR. 2d, Actions § 75-79 (splitting causes of action).
20. 8 Cal. 3d at 46, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
21. Id. at 51-52, 500 P.2d at 1354-55, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11.
22. Id. at 52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
23. Id. at 53, 500 P.2d at 1356, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
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used to determine the amount of just compensation. Therefore, as a
result of this holding the condemnee must now be indemnified for the
loss of rental income attributable to precondemnation occurrences.24
Effect of Klopping on California Condemnation Law
California's Resolution of the Valuation Problem
The first case in California establishing standards for the valua-
tion of condemned property is San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale.25
In Neale the condemnee claimed that the value of his property had
appreciated as a result of the condemnor's special need for the property
to complete the project. The condemuee thus was claiming compen-
sation which included the inflated value caused only by the condem-
nor's special need for it. In determining the valuation formula to
guide the jury, the court held that the inflated value of the land which
arises from the condemnor's special need for that particular parcel
must be excluded from the compensation award.26
Nearly fifty years later, the case of Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe Railroad Co. v. Southern Pacific Co. 27 presented the issue of
whether a condemnee should be compensated for the decline of the
market value caused by a six year precondemnation period. The court
looked to Neale's exclusion of inflated value as precedent, and with-
out distinguishing the cases denied the condemnee compensation
for the loss in value.2 The Atchison decision is contrary to the basic
condemnation principle that all taxpayers should share the condem-
nee's burden in financing projects. Atchison served to encourage con-
demnors to shift a portion of the project's cost onto the owners by
driving down market values prior to condemnation.29
Prior to Kopping, an alternative rule developed in Buena Park
School District of Orange v. Metrim Corp. and People ex rel. Dept. of
Public Works v. Lillard.0 Taken together, Buena Park School
District and Lillard embody the better rule by requiring the jury to
24. Id. "Rental lossess occasioned by a general decline in the property value
or by a natural disaster occurring prior to the date of taking must, however, be borne
by the property owner."
25. 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888).
26. Id.
27. 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 57 P.2d 575 (1936).
28. Id. at 518, 57 P.2d at 581.
29. Klopping overruled Atchison and subsequent cases which relied on it. 8 Cal.
3d at 49-50, 500 P.2d at 1353, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
30. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Lillard, 219 Cal. App. 2d 368, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 189 (1963); Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp., 176 Cal. App. 2d 255,
1 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1959). Buena Park School Dist. and Lillard are discussed extensively
in Klopping. 8 Cal. 3d at 50-51, 500 P.2d at 1353-54, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10. See
generally Andersen, Consequence of Anticipated Eminent Domain Proceedings-Is Loss
of Value a Factor?, 5 SANTA CLARA LAw. 35 (1965).
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disregard the decline in market value after the condemnor takes
steps towards acquisition of the parcel.
In Buena Park School District the condemnee had made con-
siderable progress towards a completed subdivision of land for residen-
tial housing. The condemnor initiated eminent domain proceedings
to acquire acreage for a school. The condemnee sought to have com-
pensation based on what a purchaser would have paid for the partial
subdivision without knowledge of the condemnation. In opposition,
the condemnor contended that the property should be valued as unim-
proved land since it was no longer marketable as a subdivision. The court
held that the valuation time was not after the condemnation be-
gins because at that time the property is "not actually saleable.1
3 1
Rather, the court stated:
It follows, therefore, that in arriving at the fair market value it is
necessary that the jury should disregard not only the fact of the
filing of the case but should also disregard the effect of steps taken
by the condemning authority toward that acquisition. To hold
otherwise would permit a public body to depress the market value
of the property for the purpose of acquiring it at less than market
value. 3
2
The effect of Buena Park School District was to allow the jury to
compensate based on what a willing purchaser would pay a willing sel-
ler in an open market situation. Only through this standard is the
condemnee assured of full just compensation.
Following Buena Park School District, Lillard indicated that an
expert witness may be questioned on the depreciating effect of a threat-
ened condemnation action. Furthermore, Lillard said that the jury
should be instructed to disregard the preliminary action of the con-
demnor and the resulting effect on market value.3   Finally, Buena
Park School District and Lillard required the condemnor to have taken
specific steps toward acquisition before the valuation rules were appli-
31. 176 Cal. App. 2d at 258-59, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53. Klopping's approval of
this rule affirms California's alignment with the federal rule that the Fifth Amendment
requires exclusion of any depreciation in value caused by the prospective taking once
the government is committed to the project. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) (appreciation
in value); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943) (appreciation in
value).
32. 176 Cal. App. 2d at 259, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
33. Lillard arises from a technical evidentiary problem during the trial. During
the cross-examination of the condemnor's valuation expert, the condemnee inquired
about a ten year threat of condemnation in the area and the resulting depressed market
value of the parcel. Since there had been no evidence of the precondemnation situation
nor proper foundation for the question, the trial court sustained the condemnor's ob-
jections. On appeal, the trial court was affirmed for its correct ruling in that situation,
but the court also approved of the rule in Buena Park School Dist., 219 Cal. App. 2d
at 377, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
[Vol. 25
February 19741 VALUATION IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION
cable. The rules produce compensation which is commensurate with
the property value existing prior to the condemuor's preliminary ac-
tion. 4 In Kopping the specific step toward acquisition was the
unreasonable precondemnation announcement. However, Klopping
should not be confined to its facts because all hostile precondemna-
ion conduct has the potential of depreciating market values. Klop-
ping takes a dramatic step beyond these cases by holding that any
oppressive conduct during a precondemnation period can be inter-
preted as a step toward acquisition causing compensable damages.
Kopping gives little indication of the type of oppressive conduct
which would call for an application of its valuation rules. The court
stated that "activities which give rise to such damages may be sig-
nificantly less than those which constitute a de facto taking of prop-
erty so as to measure the fair market value as of a date earlier than
that set statutorily by Code of Civil Procedure section 1249.135  Some
examples of activities which have constituted a de facto taking are:
filing of lis pendens, denial of access, denial of city services in the con-
demnation zone, notices to tenants and owners to vacate, forced demo-
lition, denial of building permits, and unreasonable maintenance of
zoning restrictions.3 6  Since the Klopping view of de facto taking
requires a physical invasion or direct legal restraint by the condem-
nor,37 these examples can be categorized as direct restraints on the
use of land prior to condemnation. Whatever actions would be in
the class of activities which would be less than a direct restraint
can be conveniently labelled indirect restraints.
Typical examples of this kind of activity can be drawn from
states which have liberal views of de facto taking encompassing indi-
rect restraints. In those states indirect restraints are defined as
abuses of the power of eminent domain.38 Rather than relying ex-
clusively on the willful or intentional acts of the condemnor, these
states recognize the necessity of compensating in some situations for
34. 219 Cal. App. 2d at 377, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 194; 176 Cal. App. 2d at 259, 1
Cal. Rptr. at 253. Klopping correctly chose this line of cases which parallels the sta-
tutory rules for negotiated sales in guaranteeing full valuation to the condemnee. 8
Cal. 3d at 51 n.3, 500 P.2d at 1354 n.3, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.3; see CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 7267.2 (West Supp. 1973); Andersen, Consequence of Anticipated Eminent Domain
Proceedings-Is Loss of Value a Factor?, 5 SANTA CLARA LAw. 35, 46-47 (1965).
35. 8 Cal. 3d at 52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
36. See generally Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. CI.
1970); Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich. 1970);
Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), affd but modified, 405
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77
Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969); In re Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896
(1965).
37. 8 Cal. 3d at 46, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
38. Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
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damage resulting merely from the natural and probable consequences
of the condemnor's actions.3 9 The adoption of a similar approach
would allow the court to evaluate the separate and cumulative impact
of these acts on the market value prior to condemnation.
As a result of Klopping, even if the owner cannot prove direct
restraints amounting to a de facto taking, the owner can rely on the
valuation rule to prove the damaging impact of indirect restraints on
the property's market value. Thus the condemnee can avert an unjust
reduction of compensation. Indirect restraints need not be defined
with any greater precision. Whether or not activity comes within these
definitions should be controlled by careful evaluation of the recog-
nized purpose of just compensation.40
An important practical consideration for condemnee suing
under Kopping is that he must establish the applicability of the valua-
tion rule. The condemnee has the burden of proving a decline in
market value proximately caused by the unreasonable activity of the
condemnor. Losses attributable to general conditions unrelated to
the condemnor's activities are not compensable. 41
Ambiguities in Klopping's Valuation Rule
Kopping's rule for disregarding depreciation in market value is
ambigious in two respects. First, as a factual matter, the court is un-
clear as to what kind of precondemnation announcement will permit
a Klopping type analysis for compensation. In Kopping, the announce-
ment was a formal city council resolution referring specifically to the
plaintiffs' parcels. There are other types of announcements which sim-
ilarly threaten to deny a condemnee just compensation and should
trigger the valuation rules enunciated in Kopping.
Precondemnation announcements may be classified on a scale
ranging from a formal specific city council resolution to a mere inter-
agency memorandum or a newspaper report. Kopping uses ex-
amples of precondemnation announcements from earlier California
cases to demonstrate when the new valuation rule should apply. These
examples are important markers on this scale of precondemnation
39. City of Cleveland v. Hurwitz, 19 Ohio Misc. 184, 47 Ohio Op. 2d 384, 249
N.E.2d 562 (1969).
40. Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). More-
over, for practical purposes a narrower reading of Klopping would render its rule mere
surplusage in light of the new stautory cause of action for inverse condemnation. See
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.1 (West 1972). This section affords an action for inverse
condemnation when a condemnor resolves to acquire a parcel and does not thereafter
initiate condemnation proceedings within six months. See generally Comment, Con-
demnation Blight: Uncompensated Losses in Eminent Domain Proceedings-Is In-
verse Condemnation the Answer?, 3 PAC. L.J. 571 (1972).
41. 8 Cal. 3d at 47, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
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announcements. Klopping mentions two situations where the state-
ment of intent to condemn would have been sufficient to require use
of the valuation rules: (1) when the announcement of intent to con-
demn was made by a deputy county counsel at a probate sale of the
subject property,42 (2) when an owner forbore from development of
his property in reliance on a statement by the condemnor of intent
to condemn.43 In contrast, the California Supreme Court in Selby
Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura44 recently implied that merely
identifying private property for future public use on a city's master plan
was not a sufficient announcement of intent to condemn.
One is not confined to Kopping for examples of announcements.
The myriad of precondemnation planning cases offers many useful
examples of precondemnation announcements which could trigger the
valuation rules.45 For example, an agent of the condemnor might
hold a formal meeting with members of the business community to
disclose and discuss the improvement plan.46  Similarly, dissemina-
tion of this type of information can occur at informal gatherings of in-
terested citizens. If the market values of the prospective condemnees
subsequently decline, they should rely on Klopping. Of course a ten-
ant can also be a condemnee entitled to protection under the valuation
rules. Therefore, when the condemnor's announcement forces a ter-
ination of the tenancy in a fashion which decreases the amount of
compensation,47 the valuation rule would apply. Finally, the mere
plotting of a city improvement on the city map coupled with an un-
42. Bank of America v. County of Los Angeles, 270 Cal. App. 2d 165, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 444 (1969). In Bank of America plaintiff presented a novel theory for recovery
based on interference with its right to sell its property because of an announcement
of future condemnation. Klopping limited its disapproval of Bank of America to the
extent that it held that recovery for losses occasioned by an announcement of intent
to condemn was prohibited. 8 Cal. 3d at 52 n.5, 500 P.2d at 1355 n.5, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 11 n.5. In Bank of America the appellant tried to prove a diminution
of market value with evidence that if bidding on its property had taken place as
planned, the bids would have been higher than the price received from the condemnor.
Klopping requires a similar proof of diminution of market value. The theory of proof
proferred in Bank of America may be useful in modern litigation under Klopping. The
retraction of a bona fide offer which is higher than anything offerred by the con-
demnor or others is excellent proof of the decline of market value since the announce-
ment of future condemnation.
43. 8 Cal. 3d at 52-53 n.5, 500 P.2d at 1356 n.5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.5;
cf. Hilltop Properties v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965).
44. 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
45. See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 127 (1971).
46. Bakken v. State, 142 Mont. 166, 382 P.2d 550 (1963). This pre-KIopping
decision denied the plaintiff relief by adopting the then California law that recovery
would be denied absent a de facto taking. Id. at 169-70, 382 P.2d at 552.
47. See Concrete Serv. Co. v. State ex reL Dep't of Pub. Works, 274 Cal. App.
2d 142, 78 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1969).
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equivocal act evidencing an intent to condemn would be sufficient to
create compensable damages.4" Presumably the announcement must
be formal and, at least, made by a public official with apparent au-
thority to make such a statement. Furthermore, though the situations
may vary, the announcement must create the impression in the minds
of the condemnee and potential purchasers that the specific parcel is
definitely slated for future eminent domain.
The second ambiguity in Kopping is whether a precondemnation
announcement is a condition precedent to an application of the valua-
tion rule. In other words, is Kopping merely one factual situation
in a broader category of unreasonable precondemnation activities
which affect beneficial use and enjoyment of property and whose ef-
fects must be disregarded in the valuation process? On one hand, the
court indicates that the precondemnation statement is an essential ele-
ment.49 One must realize that by requiring an announcement as a
condition precedent, the Kopping valuation rule would only become
operative when a subsequent condition taints the announcement, there-
by creating an unreasonable injury to the condemnee. Therefore,
this formulation requires both factors to bring a case within Kopping.
The consequence of such an approach, however, is to allow the con-
demnor to make even a malicious announcement without fear of
liability provided unreasonable conduct is subsequently avoided. Un-
der this interpretation the subsequent condition is narrowly defined as
either an excessive delay in eminent domain or as other oppressive
conduct after an announcement.8 0 This solution would lead to an un-
acceptable limitation on the use of the new valuation rule whose
raison d'etre is to avoid a denial of just compensation.
On the other hand, a better conclusion is derived from an exam-
ination of the effect of the court's holding on the use of the valuation
rule.5' The court states that improper activity by the condemnor was
either an unreasonable delay subsequent to an announcement of intent
to condemn or "other unreasonable conduct prior to condemnation.
5 -2
This distinction between a conjunctive versus a disjunctive view of
Klopping is subtle, but its consequences are important. By structuring
the sentence in an either/or alternative, the court acknowledges that
there are situations which would establish unreasonable precondemna-
48. In re Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 95 A. 429 (1915); 8 Cal. 3d at
52 n.5, 500 P.2d at 1355 n.5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11 n.5; Stafford v. People ex rel. Dep't
of Pub. Works, 144 Cal. App. 2d 79, 300 P.2d 231 (1956); cf. Silva v. City & County
of San Francisco, 87 Cal. App. 2d 784, 198 P.2d 78 (1948).
49. 8 Cal. 3d at 51-52, 500 P.2d at 1354-55, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11.
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tion conduct notwithstanding the absence of a precondemnation an-
nouncement. This approach would allow the use of the valuation rules
on a case by case examination of the condemnor's conduct.
This interpretation reflects the supreme court's intent to guarantee
just compensation in circumstances where it appears that a condemnor
caused a depression in the market value with the effect of acquiring
the property for less than market value." The full intent of the Kiop-
ping court will be realized only by allowing a condemnee to prove that
any unreasonable precondemnation conduct by the condemnor caused
a diminution in market value which must be disregarded in the valua-
tion process.
Noncompensable Incidental Losses
There are always losses occurring incidental to eminent domain,
but because they are not directly caused by a taking or damaging of
property, these losses do not come under the protective umbrella of the
just compensation clause. Kiopping retains the law that the condemnee
must absorb incidental losses; however, the court assumes that such
losses will be slight."' Incidental losses are narrowly defined in Kop-
ping as those which occur when the condemnor announces an intent
to acquire certain property and moves ahead by holding public hear-
ings, pursuing legal channels, and satisfying the other obligations which
arise from the institution of a public project. Apparently the court
feels that a reasonable period between announcing the proposed im-
provement and the eminent domain action will encourage public par-
ticipation in the decision whether the proposed project should be ap-
proved, changed, or abandoned, and therefore, is in the public interest
and necessity.55 Consequently, there may be some uncompensated
rental loss, taxes, and minor depreciation in market value which are
attributable to the risks of ownership.
In the context of Kopping where there was unreasonable precon-
demnation activity, the court said that it is a question of fact to deter-
mine the date for valuation of the property. 56 Kopping indicated that
six months after an announcement of future condemnation, rights of an
owner to use and enjoy property are probably so substantially inter-
fered with as to present a strong argument for compensation.57  In
recognition of this inequity, the court devised concept of a reasonable
53. Id. at 51 & n.3, 500 P.2d at 1354 & n.3, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 10 & n.3.
54. 8 Cal. 3d at 51-52 & n.4, 500 P.2d at 1354-55 & n.4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 10-
11 & n.4.
55. Id. at at 51, 500 P.2d at 1354, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
56. Id. at 55, 500 P.2d at 1357, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
57. Id. at 54-55, 500 P.2d at 1357, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
precondemnation period assures fairness during eminent domain. 5
The jury has much discretion when confronted with a potentially un-
reasonable precondemnation period. If the losses accummulate so as
to damage unreasonably one's incidents of ownership, then the jury
may award compensation. If the losses do not cross this intangible
and flexible border, they are merely incidental. 59 This formulation of
incidental losses will prohibit the condemnor from producing "bar-
gain" public improvements by unscrupulously driving down market
values prior to condemnation and from equivocating on its final proj-
ect plans.
60
Recovery of Loss of Rental Income
Condemnees often urge the courts to allow independent recovery
for economic losses caused during precondemnation delay, such as loss
of rental income. Although Klopping expands the concept of what
can be included in fair market value, it does not support the proposi-
tion that purely economic losses are recoverable.6" Kopping retains
58. See generally Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensa-
tion?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765 (1973).
59. See Adams, Eminent Domain, Police Power and Urban Renewal: Compensa-
tion for Interim Depreciation in Land Values, 7 GA. L. REV. 226 (1973).
60. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (West 1954). See generally Michelman, supra
note 1. Klopping is commensurate with Professor Michelman's "fairness" test for dis-
tinguishing compensable and noncompensable situations. The traditional "diminution of
value" test does not provide an adequate framework for reconciliation of the decisions in
California. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370
P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962); CAL. LAW REvIsION COMM'N, inverse Condemnation
Goals and Policy Criteria, in CALIFORNIA INVERSE CONDEMNATION LAW 75, 90 (A. Van
Alstyne). In accordance with the "fairness" test analysis, Klopping uncovers hidden
project costs such as the costs of delay and abandonment that have been shifted to
the condemnee. See Comment, Delay, Abandonment of Condemnation, and Just Coln-
pensation, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 862 (1968). California's policy has long been to avoid
forcing the owner to contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking.
See House v. Los Angeles Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 396-97, 153 P.2d 950,
956 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Klopping expands this principle by moving to-
wards Michelman's test which is grounded on determinations of fairness and social util-
ity. This is in contrast to the diminution-in-value test, the balancing test, the noxious
use test, or other tests discussed by commentators for evaluating whether compensation
is required. Notwithstanding the caveat that the fairness test is not well suited for
judicial use (Michelman, supra note 1, at 1248-53), Klopping creates some guideposts
for assuring "fairness" and avoiding capriciousness. For example, Klopping emphati-
cally requires a reasonable period for public discussion of the proposed project. Losses
accruing to the owner during such a period are not recoverable because of the need
for public participation in developing the project. Once the period extends to an un-
reasonable length, Klopping allows the condemnee to sue for recovery of losses by
proving that spoliation and cost-shifting have occurred. Compare id. at 1180-81.
61. See generally Kanner, When is "Property" Not "Property Itself": A Critical
Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent
Domain, 6 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 57 (1969).
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fair market value as the underpinning of the just conpensation clause,
but recognizes that rental income is a useful way of determining mar-
ket value under some circumstances.
The circumstance presented in KIopping was that the loss of fair
market value was best evidenced by the loss of rental income during
the precondemnation period. The court accepted "that rent is an ap-
propriate criterion for measuring fair market value.""2  Since there
is a direct functional relationship between rental income and market
value (that is, the increase and decrease in direct proportion to each
other) evidence of losses of anticipated rental income is probative of
a decline in market value. Therefore, loss of rental income calculated
over the life of the property is a measure of the decline in market
value. As such, market value is still the guide for recovering just
compensation, but a modem formula for appraising market value in-
cludes the element of loss of rental income. This element is properly
incorporated in the fair market value when the condemned property
is of such a nature that a potential purchaser other than the con-
demnor would consider the value of anticipated rental income in de-
termining the property's value. 3
For its holding the Klopping court relied on Luber v. Milwaukee
County" which granted an award for rental loss for the period be-
tween the announcement and the time the suit was filed as part of
the constitutional requirement of just compensation. The Luber anal-
ysis focused on identifying those property interests other than the own-
ership of physical property which are significant enough to be pro-
tected by just compensation. 65 Luber acknowledged that many states
have rectified "the injustice of denying recovery for other than the fair
market value of the physical property .... "00 Luber also examined
the possibility of interpreting the Wisconsin constitutional provisions
to include compensation for some distinct economic losses.0 7 How-
ever, Luber sustained the traditional theory that compensation is pro-
vided only for the value of appropriated property, and stated:
We think that under property concepts one's interest in rental in-
come is such as to deserve compensation under the "just compen-
62. 8 Cal. 3d at 53, 500 P.2d at 1356, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 12; 4 NicHOLs, supra
note 7, at §§ 12.3122, 12.42.
63. Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp., 176 Cal. App. 2d 255, 260, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 250, 254 (1960). "The market value was the value of the property in the condi-
tion it was at the time of valuation, taking into consideration all of those things which
a purchaser would properly consider."
64. 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).
65. Id. at 279, 177 N.W.2d at 384.
66. Id. at 280, 177 N.W.2d at 385; see 2A NICHOLS, supra note 7, at § 6.44
et seq.
67. 47 Wis. 2d at 282-83, 177 N.W.2d at 386.
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sation" provision of the Wisconsin Constitution.68
In conclusion, Klopping parallels Luber to the extent that they
both find that loss of rental income is a component of fair market
value and therefore is includable in the compensation award. Klop-
ping did not allow an independent recovery for loss of rental income,
separate from compensation for the fair market value of the parcel. "9
Arguably, a better policy may allow just compensation to include re-
covery for the market value of the appropriated property plus the multi-
farious economic losses suffered during the condemnation process.
However, this view is precluded by the analysis of Kopping and
Luber. Though California has not abandoned the idea that fair mar-
ket value is the sole guide for just compensation, Klopping exemplifies
how California courts will remain open to continuous modification




Klopping v. City of Whittier extends the valuation rules pre-
viously established in California to ensure just compensation for the
condemnee when precondemnation activity by a condemnor depre-
ciates market values. In Kopping, the activity was a precondemna-
tion announcement followed by a lengthy delay. However, the court
held that other types of oppressive conduct which unreasonably inter-
68. Id. at 279, 177 N.W.2d at 384 (emphasis added), quoted in 8 Cal. 3d at
53, 500 P.2d at 1356, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
69. See also 4A NICHOLS, supra note 7, at § 14.242.
70. The United States Supreme Court recently faced the same issue as the Klop-
ping court of whether to enlarge the elements of fair market value to assure full com-
pensation during condemnation. In Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v.
United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the condemnee was
entitled to compensation based on the fair market value for the leasehold, improve-
ments, and all other elements and possibilities which would be considered in the open
market, including the possibility of a renewed lease. The Court unequivocally rea-
soned that the value to be paid is based on what a willing buyer would pay in cash
to a willing seller. The inclusion of potentials and possibilities is required since prag-
matic purchasers do place value on such contingencies. See also United States v. Ful-
ler 409 U.S. 488, 503-04 (Powell, J., dissenting) (1973). The government's position
was to deny compensation for the value of the improvements beyond the remaining lease
term, since these were mere potentialities which would be valueless once there was no
possibility the lease would be renewed. The Court rejected this position because "[tihat
is not how the market would have valued such improvement; it is not what a private
buyer would have paid Almota." 409 U.S. at 478.
The language and holding lead to the conclusion that compensation can be given
for an expectant property interest. Id. at 477-78; cf. id. at 480 (dissenting opinion).
This expansion of the concept of market value is explained by the fact that just com-
pensation is based on principles of fairness as well as technical concepts of property
law. Id. at 478. Therefore, just compensation should include elements for all the valu-
able characteristics of the propery which a private party, without knowledge of im-
pending condemnation, would appraise in offering a reasonable purchase price.
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fere with the owner's use and enjoyment of the property will also
activate the valuation rule. This rule simply requires the trier of fact
to disregard any decline in market value caused by the precondem-
nation conduct. Since a precondemnation announcement is not a
condition precedent, KIopping opens new avenues for condemnees
to prove in eminent domain or inverse condemnation suits that the con-
demnor unreasonably depressed market values. Kopping is also
mindful of the need for a reasonable precondemnation period in which
the public can voice its opinion on the desirability and necessity of
the proposed public improvement. Finally, Kopping liberalized the
fair market value formula to include elements allowing for more fair
and accurate approximations of just compensation.
Kopping will be important in guaranteeing full protection for
constitutional rights during lengthy delays which generally preceed
major public projects.71 This means that projects such as urban rede-
velopment, mass transportation, and preservation and creation of open
space recreation areas can continue while most of the financial losses
of displaced property owners will be indemnified. Klopping finds the
delicate balance between encouraging careful, open planning of improve-
ments and prohibiting condemnors from minimizing project costs by
victimizing the condemnees.
Stewart H. Foreman*
71. See generally 72 COLuM. L. Rlv. 772 (1972). The writer highlights the
devastating freeze that occurs on low-income homeowners' capital prior to eminent do-
main.
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